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INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LINKAGES IN THE MNC:
THE CASE OF RD SUBSIDIARIES IN JAPAN
The challenge of strengthening, diversifying, and exploiting the cross-
border linkages within the multinational corporation has recently emerged as
one of the dominant themes in the field of international business. Competitive
pressures are driving MNC managers to seek to increase cross-border
coordination in order to exploit potential economies of scale and locational
advantages and to realize potential scope advantages by applying innovations
and knowhow generated in one subunit elsewhere in the organization1 . And in
a dynamic context, where existing products and processes are being modified
and new products introduced, cross-border coordination requires increasingly
dense cross-border interaction. The emphasis on cross-border coordination
extends to the arena of linkages with other firms, as the longstanding resort to
local joint ventures with single-country partners is being overshadowed by
global strategic alliances with other MNCs.2
The increasing density of cross-border linkages within the MNC generates
increasing pressure toward convergence in the organizational patterns of
headquarters and the various subunits in an array of countries.3 Some of this
convergence is the result of deliberate design, as it is in MNCs that have
moved to global product organizations that reach into subsidiaries to realign
their organizations more closely with that of headquarters. Even more is the
unanticipated consequence of the growing reliance on socialization -- on shared
conceptual maps and ongoing interactions -- as a control strategy. 4
Yet the pressures for convergence contend with pulls toward variation. As
the extensive literature on MNCs emphasizes, subsidiaries in different countries
are subject to different national regulatory regimes and embedded in different
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national cultures; they each bear a different legacy from their historical
development over time; and they have varying strategic mandates depending
both on that history and on the resource environments of their respective
societies. In addition, they are located in varying sets of external linkages to
other organizations within their own society.
Therefore the focus on managing the internal linkages of the MNC must be
complemented by awareness of the potential constraints on the effective
operation of those linkages from the the organizational variation among
subsidiaries and from the external networks in which each subsidiary is
embedded. This includes an understanding of the potential effect of
organizational changes on the subsidiary and its networks. If, for example, a
subsidiary in Brazil has followed the organizational patterns and human resource
development systems of local Brazilian firms, will significant changes become
necessary as its level of coordination with European subsidiaries and with its
North American parent increases? If these changes are made, making it more
similar to the patterns in those other subunits, will that have negative effects
on its capacity to function effectively in Brazil? And if new patterns are
modelled on those developed in the social context of another country, how can
their inevitable adaptation to their new organizational and social environment
be anticipated and planned for? The MNC dilemma of reconciling the benefits
of the local tailoring with those of global standardization in products and in
strategies has been joined by the organizational dilemma of local vs.
standardized organizational patterns. And in this dilemma, finding ways of
combining variation and standardization is even more complex than in the
arenas of products and strategies.
This paper explores the sources and implications for organization design of
the potentially competing pressures toward convergence and divergence within
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the MNC in the context of one function, RD, and in one society, Japan. A
growing number of American and European MNCs have recently decided to
establish R&D laboratories; in that country, both to adapt their products to the
demands of the Japanese market, the world's second largest, and to tap into
Japan's growing scientific and technical resources for application in their global
technology strategies. 5 Although one function in one country may seem a
rather small window through which to view so large an issue, there are several
factors that make it a revealing one. R&D is a function where both
intraorganizational linkages with other functions and with R&D elsewhere in the
MNC and interorganizational linkages with local sources of scientific and
technical expertise and knowledge are of critical importance. In consequence,
the organizational dilemma of local and global coordination and integration is
cast into high relief, although since the facilities are so new (many are still in
the planning stage) the outcome remains uncertain. Moreover, for most firms
the establishment of Japan-based R&D facilities means adding a new function in
that country, rather than expanding or modifying an existing function, and
consequently the constraints of established organizational patterns are not of
major importance. Finally, the dominant features of RD organization in large
Japanese corporations and the distinctive features of Japan's technology system
(including technical labour markets, the role of universities, and patterns of
interfirm cooperation in R&D) 6 raise some formidable challenges not only to
cross-subsidiary coordination but even to the successful development of a
Japan-based R&D function in the MNC.
The next section briefly looks at some of the perspectives in the
international management field that can be brought to bear on these issues.
This is followed by an examination of the dominant patterns of R&D human
resource development systems and research management systems within large
3
Japanese firms, which provide the local model for the new facility. The final
section then addresses the question of how the MNC can make the necessary
choices between those patterns and its own as it moves to establish an R&D
facility in Japan.
1. Localization, Standardization, and Coordination in MNC Organization
As any text on international management points out, multinational
corporations, almost by definition, contain higher levels of internal
organizational variety than do domestic firms, even those of a comparable scale,
because their subsidiaries are located in very different social and political
environments. Explanations for the variations across subsidiaries have focused
on four major categories of variables: national culture, national regulatory
regimes, institutional legacy of the subsidiary, and strategic intent. Recent
developments in theories of organization-environment interactions suggest that
we can usefully add a fifth category: the pulls toward similarity in structures
and processes induced by the interorganizational linkages sustained by each
subunit.
The analysis of national culture has focused on societally-induced values,
norms, and expectations held by individuals. Therefore advocates of the
importance of national culture in the organization of the MNC have tended to
emphasize the necessity of conforming to local culture, particularly in its modes
of interpersonal interaction and its motivation structures. Because the
organizational patterns dominant in the local environment provide the most
parsimonious set of indicators of these cultural patterns and how they affect
work organization, adapting to local culture has usually been interpreted to
mean adopting the behavioural norms and organizational patterns that prevail in
large local organizations. 7
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National regulatory regimes impose a different set of constraints on
organizational structures and processes, particularly in terms of setting
conditions of employment, ownership, and the range of activities in which the
MNC can or should engage. In the case of RD in Japan, this particular
perspective is of little direct relevance, since Japanese government regulation
touches RD in the MNC in making a significant Japan-based R&D capacity a
condition for participation by foreign firms in Government-sponsored research
programmes such as the Fifth Generation Computer project. However, no
regulatory constraints determine how that facility should be organized. Indeed
the theme of most recent work on national regulatory regimes and the MNC has
been the extent of the activities performed within the boundaries of a given
nation, rather than on how those activites are organized. 8
The third category for explaining variation within MNCs focuses on
variations in societies' resource environments and on the consequent variation
across subsidiaries in their strategic intents.9 This perspective is useful in
explaining why MNCs are setting up RD facilities in Japan: the combination of
the richness of local scientific and technical resources, the need to keep
abreast of Japan-based global competitors in technology, the importance and
distinctiveness of the Japanese market, the dynamism of Japanese science and
technology as its research community moves to an increased emphasis on
generating new knowledge. But like the recent work on regulatory regimes and
the MNC, it addresses the issue of what parts of the firm's value-added chain
and product line should be located within a country, rather than of how to
design the local organization.
The fourth category, the influence of institutional legacy on current
organizational patterns, might also seem to be of little relevance, given that for
most firms the Japan-based R&D facilities are new, and therefore are not
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directly constrained by a legacy of previously institutionalized patterns.
However, this perspective is important in understanding the MNC context of the
new Japanese R&D facilities, especially in terms of the nature and extent of
non-R&D activities that the MNC performs in Japan. Several MNCs that are
setting up RD labs in Japan have extensive local marketing organizations, but
do their manufacturing either offshore or through Japanese OEMs. And given
that Japan is now one of the world's highest cost manufacturing sites, MNCs
are unlikely to make major investments in manufacturing in Japan in the near
future. In such a context, many new RD labs will be in the somewhat unusual
position of handing off the technology they develop either to another part of
the MNC or to another firm within Japan.
Moreover, few of these MNCs have already built a significant technical
presence in Japan that could serve as a base for the development of more value
added research activities. In a study of the internationalization of R&D in
seven U.S. MNCs before 1973, Robert Ronstadt identified four kinds of foreign
R&D units:
1. Technology Transfer Units (TTUs): to facilitate the transfer of the parent's
technology to the subsidiary, and to provide local technical services;
2. Indigenous Technology Units (ITUr): to develop new products for the local
market, drawing on local technology;
3. Global Technology Units (GTUs): to develop new products and processes for
world markets;
4. Corporate Technology Units (CTUs): to generate basic technology for use by
the corporate parent.
Each type of unit has distinctive linkages with the local subsidiary, the
parent organization, and with local sources of technology. Ronstadt has focused
on the first two kinds of linkage, but clearly the strength of the ties with local
centres of science and technology varies across the four roles. The ties are
virtually nonexistent for a TTU, stronger for an ITU, stronger still for a GTU,
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and strongest for the CTU.
Given the relatively low level of the manufacturing presence of foreign
multinationals in Japan, even their TTUs have been extremely small, and very
few have built RD units beyond that level. 1 1 However, most of the new labs
have multiple roles from their inception: they are expected to be ITUs, GTUs,
and CTUs. This multiple mandate creates some complex problems. Rondstadt's
study identified a clear evolutionary pattern: over time, the TTUs tended to
evolve into ITUs, and a subset of the ITUs evolved into GTUs. CTUs tended,
where they were successful, to develop GTU or ITU roles. In the present case,
these "natural" evolutionary processes are being preempted by the urgency of
the MNC commitment to multiple strategic intents within Japan.
The prospect of handing off technology either across national borders or
across company boundaries and the multiple roles of the R&D units have
implications for organization that are best explored through the fifth category
of explanation, which centres on the internal and external linkages of the
organization. An important strand in this framework is the concept of
"isomorphism." Theories of organizational isomorphism posit that there are
strong pressures for increasing similarity across organizations within an
organizational field, a concept that is the sociological analogue of the industry:
"those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of
institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory
agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products." 12
Three major premises undergird the work on isomorphism. One is that the
ease of interorganizational interaction increases with similarity in organizational
structures and processes. 13 Therefore there is a strong tendency for the
patterns of organizations that occupy central positions in resource allocation
networks to be emulated by those with whom they interact, either because the
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central organization makes such emulation a condition of interaction, or because
the less powerful organizations see emulation as a strategy that can increase
their access to resources. Secondly, emulation of other organizations is also
spurred by management's use of organizational change not only to increase
legitimacy and acceptibility in the eyes of external constituencies, but also as a
powerful internal signaling device, to increase legitimacy and enhance
commitment among employees and internal stakeholders. In such cases there
are strong inducements to turn to organizational models that are strongly
established within the immediate environment.l 4 Finally, because in complex
organizational systems there is great uncertainty about what patterns are
producing certain desired outcomes, managers are likely to look for models to
other firms that are perceived as successful. This tendency is reinforced by
the growth of the "management industry" of the business press, consultants, and
management schools and schools of public affairs, all of whom generate
strictures on "best practice" and thrive on the identification of "exemplar"
organizations, thereby producing what can be seen either as a growing and
increasingly shared sophistication about organizational practice, or as a growing
tendency to fads and bandwagons, depending on one's degree of cynicism.
If one applies the the isomorphism paradigm to the MNC, one can portray
the MNC subsidiary as subject to two potentially conflicting pulls toward
emulation: those within the MNC itself, and those within the society in which
the subsidiary is located. The organizational patterns of each MNC system as a
whole are in most cases likely to be shaped by the patterns dominant in the
home society of the headquarters. But the structures and processes of the
organizations which dominate resource allocation within a subsidiary's own
society are likely to differ substantially from those dominant within the MNC's
home society. Several authors have discussed the problems created for the
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MNC headquarters if a subsidiary's dependence on it for resources (financial,
technical, or personnel) diminishes over time. Most writers have put the
difficulties in terms of an increase in the autonomy of the subsidiary. The
isomorphism paradigm suggests that in addition, as the subsidiary draws more
resources from its immediate environment, it becomes subject to a changing set
of isomorphic pressures. To the extent that these produce organizational
patterns that depart substantially from those of the parent, coordination
difficulties will increase. Regarding it simply as an issue of management
autonomy and control, therefore, may be to miss an important dimension of
organizational change.
In addition, the internal constitutencies of the subsidiary are apt to have
a different set of expectations about patterns that confer enhanced legitimacy
and increase commitment than do the internal constituencies of the home
country headquarters. If matrix organization is widely recognized as an
"advanced" organizational form in the United States, for example, employees of
the home country organization of a US-based MNC are more likely to regard a
move to a matrix structure positively than are subsidiary employees in a
country where matrix organization has not been widely introduced. Such issues
have been addressed by the MNC literature largely in terms of differences in
culture; the isomorphism directs attention more to the specific organizational
patterns that dominate an organizational field within a society than to the more
general value orientations of individual employees.
This emphasis on the important influence of the organization's external
linkages is an important complement to the current focus on internal linkages
within the multinational corporation; it also focuses more attention on the
organizational implications of both kinds of linkage. Both are important
perspectives in helping MNC managers make decisions about organizational
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design in subsidiaries.
R&D facilities in Japan provide a case in point. Their managers confront
four interrelated challenges: setting the RD agenda; building a human resource
development system; establishing a research management system; and building
the "knowledge networks" with the Japanese organizations that are sources of
scientific and technical information and stimuli to innovation. In facing the
last three issues, they must decide whether to follow the patterns of their own
organization, to emulate those which prevail in comparable organizations in
Japan, or to compromise in some fashion between the two. To the extent that
the established patterns of RD in the multinational resemble the dominant
Japanese patterns, the MNC faces relatively few problems in deciding how to
design its HRD and research management systems in the Japanese context. But
to the extent that its own patterns are different from the prevailing Japanese
model, then managers face no small difficulty in making these decisions.
The following section summarizes the main features of RD organization in
large Japanese firms, as a background for assessing how MNC managers can
make decisions about how important a model thse should be for their own
organization.
2. Organizational and Interorganizational Patterns of RD in Japan
In Japan, there are greater similarities in the structures and processes of
large-scale organizations across industries and across sectors than is the case in
societies whose industrial development was less compressed in time. As a
result, it is possible to speak of "Japanese" patterns of organization in large
firms without as much danger of overgeneralization as is the case with the
United States and Europe, although of course there are still important
differences across individual firms and between firms and government and
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university structures. In RD, there are a number of commonalities across
large firms, especially in human resource development systems. These are
shaped in large part by the general HRD systems of large Japanese firms (the
recruitment of new graduates, longterm employment, standardized rewards, and
so on) but have some distinctive features produced by the nature of Japanese
technical labour markets.
In Japan, as in most societies, the universities are the major source of
scientific and technical personnel. In Japan, however, the leading universities
play a more important role in allocating technical people to firms than in most
highly industrialized societies. Especially for the Master's graduates who
constitute the lion's share of the recruits to R&D laboratories, the professors at
the elite universities allocate their students among a core group of leading
companies in the industry. The professor writes one recommendation letter to
one leading company for each of his Master's students; the company will as a
matter of course hire that student; and students do not feel free to approach a
major company to which the professor has not written. For the Bachelor's
graduates who are recruited into divisional labs, the university placement offices
are the most influential channel for guiding students into firms. The professors
and the placement offices therefore assume considerable responsibility in
evaluating firms to make sure that they provide secure and predictable career
ladders for their recruits. In other words, they favour the large, established
companies over smaller firms. This is one of the strong "isomorphic" pulls on
R&D organization in Japan: firms with aspirations to recruit Master's graduates
from the elite universities must conform to certain organizational patterns of
long-term commitment to employees, sustained commitment to spending on R&D
in large and well-equipped laboratories, and a sustained relationship with the
elite universities.
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The number of mid-career recruits into the R&D organization of large
firms is very small compared to most Western societies. In principle, large
firms do not recruit from other organizations in either managerial or research
positions. However, there are perhaps more exceptions for R&D than for any
other function. Under certain circumstances -- such as expansion into new
research areas, or extremely rapid growth in a certain field, or a "hole" in the
cohorts from which project leaders are chosen because an earlier economic
slowdown contracted recruitment in the past -- the firm will go to the elite
universities, government laboratories, or public corporations such as NTT or
NHK (but not, be it noted, to competing firms) to hire researchers in their
early or mid-thirties. A recent study of fifteen leading firms in eight
industries found that of a total intake of 2,400 researchers in 1984, only 90
(3.7%) were mid-career recruits. The ratio of mid-career hires was highest in
the heavy machinery industry, where the firms were making strenuous efforts to
develop new business fields; five of the fifteen firms hired no mid-career
researchers at all. 15
Given this heavy reliance on new graduates, firms can and do put their
R&D hires through a standardized entry-level training programme. Nearly all
large firms combine the training of their research recruits with that of their
managerial recruits, in several months of full-time training that includes
intensive education about the company as a whole and rotation across functions
(in Oki Electric Company, for example, both managerial and technical recruits
even spend some time in a retail store selling Oki products, to provide them
with direct exposure to customers).
Given the difficulties of hiring mid-career researchers and given the
nature of Japanese university education, companies also seem to assume greater
responsibility for training researchers in Japan. Graduates of Japanese science
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and engineering departments are less likely than their U.S. counterparts to have
experienced internships or summer jobs in companies or to have industry-related
research experience within the university lab. Education also tends to be more
general and theoretical. As a result, R&D managers in Japan say that it takes
about two years of primarily on-the-job training to bring a Masters graduate up
to the level of making an independent contribution to research projects. But
while on-the-job training by more experienced researchers remains the primary
vehicle for enhancing the skills of the new researcher, off-the-job training is
also significant. A 1979 survey of off-the-job training practices in leading
Japanese firms found that over the previous three years 6.4% had been
dispatched to other companies or industrial associations on research projects
with a training agenda; 5.7% had studied at the graduate school of a foreign
university or engaged in a cooperative research project overseas, and 9.7% had
enrolled in graduate courses at a Japanese university or been sent on temporary
assignment to an outside research organization.l 6 The practices of sending
researchers to external research organizations and other firms as part of an
HRD strategy is widespread. Although systematic comparison is not possible
without similar data for U.S. firms, the use of external assignments as a
training mechanism seems more widespread in Japan.
- The entry-level training program also provides the company with an
opportunity to assess the potential of each recruit, and initial job assignments
are made at least in part on the basis of performance in training. But
evaluation is a long-term process. One common characteristic of large Japanese
firms is that the time frame for the evaluation of their researchers as well as
of their managerial employees is from five to ten years. During this period,
most firms provide their researchers with virtually no formal evaluation
feedback. Researchers have no access to their annual evaluation reports, and
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there are few companies that formalize performance assessments. The
companies rely instead on the intense interaction between superiors and
subordinates to provide constant informal signals. This is in marked contrast to
the prevailing patterns in U.S. research organizations, where formal performance
appraisals and feedback interviews are standard. In both the U.S. and Japanese
systems research managers and project leaders have significant responsibility for
fostering the development of their subordinates. In the United States, however,
the emphasis tends to fall on formal evaluation and feedback procedures; in
Japan, on informal interactions.
This in turn is linked to a pervasive difference between the reward
structures of the two systems. Most U.S. RD organizations use some form of
performance-based compensation, and an important function of the formal
feedback procedures is to justify to each researcher the size of his or her pay
package for the next year. Large Japanese firms, on the other hand, have a
highly standardized salary and promotion structure, where outstanding
achievement is not rewarded by significant pay increases. Salaries are virtually
uniform across functions and areas, with seniority being the prime determinant
of income.
This standardized reward system facilitates the transfer of research
personnel that is a key feature of career structures and technology transfer in
many large Japanese firm. In most leading firms, technology is transferred from
R&D to manufacturing by transferring one of the project members to a
divisional laboratory or engineering facility attached to the manufacturing
division. In many firms this is not a temporary transfer but the next move on
a career ladder that will eventually move into line management. Since nearly
all researchers follow this career line, the move is generally accepted if not
welcomed, even by those researchers who regret leaving advanced development
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work. The personnel transfers that are the primary vehicle for technology
transfer exemplify one of the principal general features of the Japanese HRD
system in R&D. In Japan, the locus of responsibility for the individual
researchers' career clearly lies with the company. From the initial training
through the assignment of researchers to projects and to post-entry training,
the responsibility for planning a career that makes the best use of each
individual's abilities (the best use for the company, not necessarily the
individual) rests with the company. Yet this does not seem to require larger
personnel departments in Japanese R&D organization; the guidance comes from
R&D managers themselves, rather than from personnel specialists.
Less systematic information is available on project management systems in
Japanese firms than on HRD systems. The mode of technology transfer (linked
as it is to HRD systems) is the clearest: the movement of researchers from the
project through the production process. This pattern has been facilitated by
the expansion of development facilities attached to product lines or to regional
manufacturing facilities over the last ten years. Not only has the enhancement
of the technical capability at the manufacturing facility helped in incremental
product and process innovations; it has enabled the firms to hold down the size
of their central R&D facilities, most of which have grown very little over the
last decade. The relatively small size of the central lab in turn fosters the
ongoing reliance on informal means of project monitoring. Compared to
U.S. firms, Japanese central RD laboratories have fewer formal systems for
scheduling and checking on research projects. However, the open office
systems and the consequent daily communication enable research managers to
keep a close informal watch on the progress of various projects.
A recent study comparing Japanese and U.S. computer firms produced the
following points of contrast in project management: Japanese firms exhibited
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greater reliance on informal methods of montiroing projects; less weight given
to technical expertise in the selection of project leaders and more to seniority,
past experience in successful projects, and administrative ability; and a longer
period of "pre-project" work (exploratory research before formal project
commitment) and a corresponding level of slack built into research budgets to
accomodate it. 1 7
Finally, the "knowledge networks" in the Japanese technology system --
the linkages across the various organizations that are sources of scientific and
technical knowledge and expertise -- differ somewhat from those in the United
States and Europe. Universities are of more importance as a source of
personnel than as centres of research. However, they remain important centres
of information about developments in the research community, in part because
employees of large firms and government laboratories generally maintain regular
contact with their former professors, and in part because the professors in the
elite universities are themselves participants in government technology advisory
committees and projects.
Firms in Japan are also likely to have an extended portfolio of joint
research projects: with other firms, with government labs, and even (somewhat
surprisingly in view of the widespread belief in the poverty of the research
capacity of Japanese universities) with Japanese universities. Most of the
attention paid to interfirm RD projects has focused on the large-scale
government-sponsored projects that bring together competitors to work together
under a single project structure, such as the VLSI project or the Fifth
Generation Computer project. However, firms participate much more extensively
in joint projects with their suppliers or with client firms (Exhibit 118).
(EXHIBIT 1 ABOUT HERE)
Relatively little public information or research exists concerning the operation
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EXHIBIT 1: JOINT RESEARCH PROJECTS IN JAPANESE FIRMS
A B C
JAPANESE FOREIGN THINK
UNIVERSITIES UNIVERSITIES TANKS
MATERIALS & CHEMICALS
KYOWA HAKKO
KONISHIROKU 2
DAIKIN
DAIDO 5
DAINIPPON INK
CONSUMER PRODUCTS
KAO 4
NISSHIN 1
MEIJI 1
SNOW 4
LION 2
60
-3
10
-10
10
0-50
0-12
0-12
0-50
0-30
MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT
KUBOTA 6-10
NIPPON KOGYO 30-40
HOCHIKI 5-6
YANMAR 4-5
ELECTRICAL
SUMITOMO EL.
TOSHIBA
HITACHI
CONSTRUCTION
SHIMIZU
TAKENAKA
ELECTRIC POWER
TOHOKU
DENRYOKU
40-50
60
20-30
15-20
4-5
0
1-2
2-3
1-2
1-2
8-10
2-3
203
3-4
3-5
2-5
4-5
1-2
3-4
2-3
30-40
3-5
1-2
0
4-5
0
10
3-4
1-2
1-2
1-1
25-30
30-40
D E F
OTHER GOV'T & FOREIGN
COMPANIES PUBLIC LABS COMPANIES
3-5
4-5
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10-20
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10-15
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2-3
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5
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3-5
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10
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5
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1
2-3
1-2
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4-5
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15-20
32-33
21-42
51-65
69-89
36-46
36-46
55-77
68-105
28-40
54-65
10-14
12-17
108-139
63-65
130-180
93-125
29-42
40 5 210
of these projects, but they seem to run the gamut from small projects with
relatively little interaction between the two firms to truly joint research, with
an exchange of researchers and frequent problem-solving meetings. Those
projects that involve the exchange of researchers are also a part of the HRD
programmes of the firm. The exchange of researchers and close interfirm
coordination on R&D projects are facilitated by the similarities in career
structures, reward systems, and project management practices across Japanese
firms. Especially critical are what Yoshino and Lifson have dubbed (in the
context of Japanese trading companies) "parallel hierarchies", that is, structures
by which "people who entered each bureaucracy can be expected to have
contemporaries who entered the others in the same year and who are at
approximately the same levels of responsibility and discretion." 19
One last feature of the "knowledge networks" of Japanese R&D
organization should be noted, and that is the strong professional orientation
among researchers. Western writers on the Japanese technology system have
asserted that professional orientation is relatively weak among researchers in
Japan's large corporations, given the system of lifetime employment and their
presumably strong company orientation. 20 However, the comparative study of
the computer industry referred to above found that researchers in the Japanese
firms were more likely than their U.S. counterparts to belong to professional
associations, attend professional meetings, and to feel that their company
encouraged them to publish their research results. The importance of the
professional associations in the knowledge networks in Japan
has been overlooked in the Western-language literature on the Japanese
technology system; it should not be overlooked by the Western firm entering
Japan with R&D facilities.
The portrayal of the patterns of R&D in Japanese firms would be
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incomplete without some assessment of the direction of change. The dynamic
evolution of R&D from the early 1950s, when most leading firms in Japan
established their first research organizations, has continued to the present day.
The current trend of change is the identification of basic research and the
generation of original technology as major national priorities by both
government and private industry. This has led to growing criticism of the
rigidities of R&D careers and organization as a legacy of an earlier stage of
manufacturing-oriented RD. The parallel hierarchies and standardized
organizational careers that have so facilitated the internal transfer of
technology from the lab to the factory, collaborative interfirm research, and the
exchange of researchers across companies is increasingly criticized as stifling
individual creativity and discouraging lifetime commitments to research.
The Japanese press, younger Japanese researchers, and Japanese RD
managers are engaged in increasing discussion of the desirability of mid-career
recruitment, performance-based evaluation and reward systems, promotion by
technical achievement rather than seniority, and greater variety of careers
within R&D to allow for more specialized and longer-term technical ladders.
There is growing scrutiny of personnel practices in U.S. and European research
organization that foster basic research and major technology breakthroughs. 2 1
Yet despite some very conscious but isolated emulation of certain Western
patterns (such as the "blue sky room" at Canon's central research laboratory),
there has so far been little actual change in the overall organization of RD.
This in itself suggests the strength of the systemic supports for the current
patterns, whose standardization facilitates both internal technology transfer and
interfirm cooperative research. It is in fact unclear what the direction and
extent of future change will be, and this adds yet another dimension of
complexity for MNC managers: emulating the patterns dominant in Japan today
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may mean adopting an obsolescing model.
3. Organization Design in the RD Subunit in Japan
The concept of national culture as the major determinant of organization
would suggest that all MNCs face a common set of constraints and expectations
in setting up RD facilities in Japan, based on "Japanese-style management".
On the other hand, both the perspective that urges the importance of a
strategic mandate to fit the local and the corporate environments and the
isomorphism perspective argue for considerable variation across MNCs, depending
on the actual and anticipated networks of the Japanese subunit.
In the simplest terms, the emulation of the MNC corporate patterns of
R&D organization in the Japanese lab would be most appropriate under the
following conditions:
(a) when the technology generated by the local R&D organization is routinely
transferred across borders to other parts of the MNC;
(b) when linkages between the local lab and corporate RD are dense and
sustained;
(c) when organizational patterns are seen as a critical element of the firm's
competitive advantage (the most vivid contemporary example is not in RD but
in manufacturing: Japanese auto firms have invested heavily in training blue
collar workers in their distinctive production systems).
These conditions are most likely when the Japanese lab is developing technology
for use in the MNC's global markets (GTU) or is generating basic research for
further development in the corporate lab (CTU).
On the other hand, emulation of locally dominant patterns will be
favoured:
(a) when technology is routinely transferred to local manufacturing operations:
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(b) when linkages with local RD organizations and the local scientific and
technical community are dense and sustained.
These conditions are most likely when the lab is focusing on developing
technology for use in the Japanese market.
However, in fact the Japanese RD facility may well be faced with
conditions of both types. Technology may be transferred both to local and to
offshore manufacturing facilities (as is increasingly the case for IBM-Japan, in
the face of the rapidly appreciating yen). The local lab may also be trying
simultaneously to develop close linkages with corporate R&D and with local R&D
organizations, as it must when it is playing the combined role of an ITU, a
GTU, and a CTU, and when its technical capacity is brought to critical mass by
leveraging it with cooperative projects with the corporate lab and with local
partners or "strategic allies". The importance of such leveraging strategies, in
turn, is reinforced by the peculiar difficulties of recruitment in Japan's
technical labour markets. These three processes -- recruiting, leveraging
technical capacity, and technology transfer -- are of critical importance in
deciding how (as opposed to whether) to balance local and corporate
organizational models.
The R&D subunit will have to recruit in two markets that at first blush
may seem to place contradictory demands on its organization. The recruitment
of new graduates is controlled by professors and placement offices at the
universities. Their principal criterion for directing students towards employers
is the company's capacity for assuring them of a long-term career that provides
the opportunity for the full development of their abilities. Many Western
employers equate this with "lifetime employment" or job security, but it goes
well beyond a commitment to keep an individual on a payroll. It demands a
company that has the resources and the organization to enable the technical
20
graduate to develop his capacities to the full. It also means a company which
accepts its responsibility for the careers of its employees in the fullest sense of
the word, and. therefore usually implies a high measure of guidance and career
structure.
On the other hand, mid-career recruits are likely to be those who are
dissatisfied with the constraints of their careers in large Japanese firms and
who want more choice in the direction of their careers. They are more apt to
be attracted by a lower level of career structure.
One solution may be to develop a career structure in which autonomy and
choice increase over time, and in which the "Japanese" patterns of emphasizing
the research manager's responsibility for developing the skills of junior people
and research management's responsibility for overall career opportunities are
combined with a "Western" pattern of soliciting greater involvement of
individuals in planning their own careers and providing greater feedback on
what the individual's attainable prospects might be.
Because of the relative newness of most of the MNC labs in Japan, clear
career planning will be of critical importance. In the large Japanese firm young
researchers can easily visualize the long-term contours of their careers by
observing those of their older colleagues. The MNC lab that is "ramping up" in
staff and research agenda does not provide such models, and therefore the
likely options have to be made explicit and the young researchers convinced
that the RD agenda of the facility will be set with one eye to the longterm
implications for human resource development even as the other eye is firmly
fixed onn the immediate output of techology as a contribution to the overall
strategy of the firm. Researchers will probably want evidence that the MNC
has at least considered seriously what the people it is hiring today are likely to
be doing in twenty years.
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Reward structures are of course related to recruitment. The strengthening
yen has made it increasingly difficult for U.S. and European firms to consider
trying to attract research staff simply by offering significantly higher salaries
than the leading Japanese firms, even if that had been a viable option in the
past. They can, however, offer inducements such as a performance-based
reward system in which pay is less tightly coupled to seniority and rank than in
Japanese firms, the prospect of a long-term research career (as opposed to the
relatively early move into application and then line management of most
Japanese firms), and overseas experience in the corporate labs or in Western
universities. This last also may be a useful way to develop the technical skills
of the Japanese recruits (and it should be accompanied by a willingness to send
such people to an intensive summer language programme abroad, as most
Japanese firms do to prepare technical employees for overseas assignments).
Short-term assignments to the corporate lab can also provide a way of
leveraging the capacity of the local lab, if they are part of a programme of
joint research projects. Leveraging of some form is a necessity. In its early
stages of development, the Japanese RD subsidiary is relatively small, and yet
to attract good people it must have a research agenda that includes challenging
projects. The corporate lab can contribute to enhancing the Japanese lab's
capacity to do such research in at least three ways:
(a) Joint projects, accompanied by an exchange of researchers on short-term
assignment;
(b) Dispatching researchers from the corporate lab to work in the Japanese lab;
(c) Sending a senior, professionally established scientist from the corporate lab
on short-term assignment (especially someone working in basic or very advanced
areas) to interact with the Japanese scientific and technical community, raise
the facility's visibility, and symbolize the MNC's commitment to Japan. To the
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extent that the Japanese lab is expected to be tightly coupled with the
corporate lab in the long term, as well as in its early stages (i.e. to the extent
that it has a CTU role), emulation of the corporate patterns will likely
facilitate its development.
But in addition, the lab can leverage its capacity by drawing on outside
organizations:
(a) Joint research projects with Japanese firms who are suppliers or customers,
accompanied by an exchange of researchers;
(b) Joint projects with Japanese university professors, with the dispatch of one
or more employees to the university lab;
(c) Joint projects with other MNC research subsidiaries in Japan.
The ITU role is more likely to favour the ongoing resort to such strategies.
If both methods (corporate linkages and local linkages) are chosen -- the
likeliest strategy -- then how can the lab deal with the potentially competing
pulls on its organizational processes? More systematic empirical case research
is clearly necessary before this question can be answered with any confidence,
but one possibility is the combination of the following:
(a) A dual project management system, with one pattern (for projects with
Japanese companies) that emulates the communications patterns, decision-making
patterns, and role division of the Japanese system, and another that emulates
the patterns of the corporate lab;
(b) training programmes that spell out for researchers in the local lab the
differences between the two systems and the rationale behind each, in order to
create "ambidextrous" researchers who can function in both systems;
(c) an effort to involve the researchers themselves in self-conscious learning
about which patterns facilitate which kinds of projects.
Finally, technology transfer across borders is an area where the experience
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of the corporate laboratory is critically important, and where corporate patterns
should provide the model. Few Japanese firms have yet systematically developed
methods of transferring technology directly from their Japanese labs to
production operations overseas. The dominant mode is still to make the initial
transfer to Japan-based production facilities, and then transfer the technology
to facilities overseas after the learning process is virtually complete. American
and European firms are far more likely to have extensive experience in
developing systems for cross-border technology transfer across functions.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Japan-based RD subsidiary faces some problems that are
peculiar to the Japanese environment and to the existing level of foreign MNC
presence there. But the dilemma of how to organize such a facility has general
implications that go well beyond the country-specific application. The
organizational structures and processes in any national subsidiary are strongly
influenced by the kind and intensity of linkages within and across the
boundaries of the MNC, and they in turn influence the efficiency and
effectiveness of those linkages. As managers increasingly move to change those
linkages, the theory and practice of international management must move to
focus on their relationship to the MNC's organizational patterns at the corprate
and local levels. The case of the emerging Japan-based R&D subsidiaries
provides both a fascinating test in prospect for our existing theories and
practices and a venue for improving them.
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